The Merida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: The New Paradigm for Security Cooperation, Attacking Organized Crime, Corruption and Violence by Hendrix, Steven E.
Loyola University Chicago International Law Review
Volume 5
Issue 2 Spring/Summer 2008 Article 2
2008
The Merida Initiative for Mexico and Central
America: The New Paradigm for Security
Cooperation, Attacking Organized Crime,
Corruption and Violence
Steven E. Hendrix
U.S. Agency for International Development
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lucilr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Feature Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago
International Law Review by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Steven E. Hendrix The Merida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: The New Paradigm for Security Cooperation, Attacking Organized
Crime, Corruption and Violence, 5 Loy. U. Chi. Int'l L. Rev. 107 (2008).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lucilr/vol5/iss2/2
THE MRIDA INITIATIVE FOR MEXICO AND
CENTRAL AMERICA: THE NEW PARADIGM FOR SECURITY
COOPERATION, ATTACKING ORGANIZED
CRIME, CORRUPTION AND VIOLENCE
Steven E. Hendrixt
The M6rida Initiative (the "Initiative") offers the United States, Mexico,
and Central America the opportunity to deepen mutual commitments to
each other and join together to attack a common enemy: organized crime
and corruption.
Why Should We Care?
As Americans, we must both confront and admit that our citizens have a prob-
lem with narcotics. In 2007, approximately 24,000 Americans died because of
drugs - a figure approximately eight times the number of victims from Septem-
ber 11, 2001.' One in four families is affected by substance abuse. 2 About one
million Americans are heroine addicts.3 Drugs have a $200 billion negative ef-
fect on the U.S. economy.4 Roughly eighty percent of all persons in prison in the
United States are either drug traffickers, or they committed a crime while on
drugs, or they committed a crime to get money to buy drugs. 5 There is no school
district in the United States, no Congressional district for that matter, which is
not affected by drugs.
Mexico also has serious narcotic problems expanding beyond issues with our
joint border.6 According to the United States General Accounting Office, Mex-
t Mexico and Central America Desk, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and
Senior Research Fellow, De Paul University College of Law, International Human Rights Law Institute.
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I Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Presentation by Robert "Bobby" Charles, Assistant
Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Washington, DC, Nov. 8, 2007
available at http://www.aei.org/events/filter.,eventID.1584/transcript.asp [hereinafter Charles].
2 See generally Common Sense for Drug War Policy, "Drug War Facts" Dec. 31, 2007, available at
http://www.drugwarfacts.org/prisdrug.htm.
3 Charles, supra note 1; Drug War Facts, supra note 2 at 49 (noting that a National Survey on Drug
Use and Health 2005 estimated that the US population aged twelve and over frequently using heroin was
very slight).
4 Charles, supra note 1.
5 Id.
6 See Alfredo Corchado, Exclusive: Drug Cartels Operate Training Camps Near Texas Border Just
Inside Mexico, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, March 29, 2008.
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ico's drug trade is worth twenty-three billion dollars a year.7 The Washington
Post noted that, "[m]ore than 20,000 Mexican troops and federal police are en-
gaged in a multi-front war with the private armies of rival drug lords, a conflict
that is being waged most fiercely along the 2000 mile length of the U.S.-Mexico
border."8 The U.S. State Department notes that about ninety percent of all co-
caine coming into the U.S. comes through Mexico. 9
In terms of citizen security situations, Nuevo Laredo and Tijuana have ele-
ments of failed states. Nuevo Laredo actually has checkpoints manned by gang
members of the Zetas, an organized criminal enterprise reminiscent of the cruel
Chicago-style mafia of the 1930s. 10 Through threats and intimidation, along with
selective assassination, drug gangs, including the Zetas, have managed to stifle
the press."1 Today, drug cartels decide what the media will publish in Nuevo
Laredo. When the newspaper editor from "El Mafiana" did not comply, he was
killed, and the press effectively silenced. I2 Seventy-one Americans have been
killed there by drug traffickers. 13 Texas Congressman Henry Cuellar notes that
just across the border from his district, in Nuevo Laredo, there were sixty kidnap-
pings of American citizens last year. 14 Through intimating and silencing dissent,
the civic movement has effectively died. Adding to security problems, two thou-
sand weapons enter Mexico daily from the United States. 15
In April 2006, the United States Agency for International Development's
(USAID) assessment on gangs noted that rising crime is threatening democratic
development and slowing economic growth across Central America and Mex-
ico. 16 Gang activity has transcended the borders of Central America, Mexico,
7 Manuel Roig-Franzia, Drug Trade Tyranny on The Border: Mexican Cartels Maintain Grasp With
Weapons, Cash and Savagery, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2008 at A01. (Estimate based on U.S. Government
Accountability Office Report).
8 Id. See also Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, Mexico's Drug-Related Murders Rise, National Public Ra-
dio, Morning Edition broadcast (Dec. 17, 2007), recording available at www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld= 17307578.
9 BUREAU FOR INT'L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INT'L NAR-
COTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT Vol. I, at 167 (Mar. 2007) [hereinafter Int'l Narcotics Control Strat-
egy Report], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/81446.pdf; accord Roig-Franzia,
supra note 7; accord U.S. Security Assistance to Mexico: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Western
Hemisphere of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 69 (2007) (testimony of Joy Olson, Exec.
Director, Washington Office on Latin America).
10 Richard Walker, Terror Plagues Border: Corruption, Kidnapping, Crime Ruining Texas Town,
AM. FREE PRESS, Aug. 1, 2005, available at http://www.americanfreepress.net/html/terror-plagues_
border.html; see also John Ross, Drug War Mayhem Boils Over from Border to Border, COUNTERPUNCH,
February 14, 2008 available at http://www.counterpunch.org/ross02142008.html.
II Susana Hayward, Local Press Silent on Drug War, EL UNIVERSAL MEXICO NEWS, Aug. 13, 2005,
available at http://www2.eluniversal.com.mx/pls/impreso/noticia.html?id-nota=11540&tabla=miami.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 U.S. Rep. Henry Cuellar, Keynote Address at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research on Battling the Deadly Drug Cartels in Mexico: A Shared Responsibility (Nov. 8, 2007), (tran-
script available at http://www.aei.org/events/filter.,eventID. 1584/transcfipt.asp).
15 Id.
16 U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO GANG ASSESSMENT, 5 (April
2006), available at http://www.usaid.govlgt/docs/gangs-assessment.pdf.
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and the United States and evolved into a transnational concern that demands a
coordinated, multi-national response to effectively combat increasingly sophisti-
cated criminal gang networks. The U.S. Department of Justice estimates that
there are some 30,000 gangs with approximately 800,000 members operating in
the United States. 17
Whereas gang activity used to be territorially confined to local neighborhoods,
globalization, sophisticated communications technologies, and travel patterns
have facilitated the expansion of gang activity across neighborhoods, cities, and
countries. The monikers of notorious gangs such as Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13)
and the 18th Street gang (Barrio 18) now appear in communities throughout the
United States, Central America, and Mexico. Members of these international
gangs move fluidly in and out of these neighboring countries. 18
In October 2007, Congress passed a resolution calling for the administration to
fund the inter-agency anti-gang strategy, something the M6rida Initiative would
do. 19
How We Got Here
A historical context is important at this point in order to fully grasp the situa-
tion. Mexican President Felipe Calder6n was elected in September 2006.20 No-
tably, Calder6n's predecessor, Vicente Fox, was the first democratically-elected
president in Mexico since the Mexican Revolution seventy years earlier who was
not a member of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).2 1 Calder6n's
inaugeration represented the first democratic transfer of power in Mexican his-
tory from one democratically-elected president to his successor. For Mexico, this
was a moment on par with the significance of the fall of the Berlin Wall to East
and West Germans.
One of the first things Calder6n did, as President, was to meet with President
Bush in M6rida, Yucatdn, M6xico in March 2007.22 Again, this is highly unusual
for a Mexican president to seek out American cooperation at such an early point
in his Administration. At that meeting, President Calder6n shared some alarming
17 Id. at 10-11.
18 Id. at 5.
19 H.R. Res. 564, 1 10th Cong., 153 CoNG. REC. 11090 (2007) (enacted).
20 Roberto Mallen, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Mexico's Felipe Calder6n (Nov. 6, 2007), http://
www.coha.org/2007/1I /06/mexicos-felipe-caldern/.
21 Kevin Sullivan & Mary Jordan, For Mexico's Fox, a 'Revolution' Unfulfilled, WASH. POST, June
27, 2005, at A01.
22 State Department Office of the Spokesman, "Fact Sheet: The Merida Initiative: United States -
Mexico - Central America Security Cooperation," U.S. Department of State, Oct. 22, 2007, available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/93800.htm.
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news with his American counterpart; 23 he noted that organized crime had a seri-
ous grip on Mexico.24
The day before Presidents Bush and Calder6n met in M6rida, President Bush
was in Guatemala, meeting with their President Oscar Berger.25 On March 12,
2007, speaking from Guatemala City, President Bush noted:
Our countries are working together to fight transnational gangs. And
the President [Berger] was right - I suggested we think about this issue
regionally. You've got to understand that these gangs are able to move
throughout Central America and up through Mexico into our own coun-
try, and therefore, we've got to think regionally and act regionally.
26
Historically, through the narcotics certification process, the U.S. issued coun-
try reports assessing how well various third world countries were working to stop
the flow of illegal drugs. 27 The identified countries, in turn, often criticized the
United States for causing the problem through U.S. demand for drugs, and won-
dered how the U.S. could sit in judgment on its neighbors. 28 It was a historic
opportunity for both the U.S. and Mexico to join forces in a new collaborative
way. This partnership is unprecedented between the two countries in that it pro-
vides for collaborative, peer-to-peer coordination on a scale never before
imagined.
With the Mrrida Initiative, the old "name and blame" game has receded to the
past, and has been replaced with a new security partnership based on collabora-
tion and mutual respect.29 We realize that we cannot succeed without the help of
the Mexicans, and they cannot succeed without our help. Historically, Mexico
has not asked for our help and has received little help from anyone else for that
matter. On our side, we like to think that we can get the job done ourselves. But
in this case, we are all fighting an enemy in organized crime that is opportunistic
and borderless.
23 Roberta Jacobson, Statement, in Five Perspectives on the Merida Initiative, LATIN AMERICAN
OUTLOOK (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy, Wash., D.C.), Mar. 4, 2008, available at http://www.aei.org/
publications/publD.27601/pub detail.asp.
24 Id. President's Remarks at a Dinner Hosted by President Felipe de Jesus Calder6n in Mrrida,
Mexico, 43 WEEKLY COMP. Pres. Doc. 327 (Mar. 13, 2007).
25 President's News Conference with President Oscar Berger Perdomo of Guatemala in Guatemala
City, 43 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 317 (Mar. 12, 2007).
26 Id. at 318.
27 See, e.g., Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Western Hemisphere of the S. Comm. on Peace
Corps, Narcotics, and Terrorism, 105th Cong. (Mar. 12, 1997) (testimony of Robert S. Gelbard, Assis-
tant Sec'y for Int'l Narcotics & Law Enforcement Aff.), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/
1997_- hr/s970312g.htm. The new procedure is laid out by the U.S. Dep't of State. Narcotics Certification
Process, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, available at http://www.state.gov/p/inlc I 1766.htm.
28 Mark A. Chinen, Presidential Certifications in U.S. Foreign Policy Legislation, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 217, 219, 271-72 (1999).
29 Alfredo Corchado & Tim Connolly, U.S. Seeks Unity Against Drug Trade, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Jan. 16, 2008.
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Like us, Mexico perceives organized crime, including the narcotics trade, as
having serious consequences30 and Mexico is willing to do its part to attack this
problem. 31 The Calder6n government is working diligently to increase and sus-
tain public security by strengthening the rule of law as a basic tenet of Mexico's
democracy.32 In tandem, the Initiative remains respectful of Mexican sover-
eignty by tracking the Mexican National Development Plan and responding to
Mexican requests for assistance. 33 But, as President Calder6n discovered for
himself during the transition and early in his presidency, there are geographic
areas of Mexico where even the government has no control. 34 The situation was
much worse than even he ever imagined. It was a crisis.
The Mexican situation erupted regionally in January 2008. Street battles in
Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana and Tamaulipas between security forces and drug traf-
fickers involved heavy weaponry and resulted in multiple casualties and arrests. 35
The regional nature of the threat is evident from the January 2008 murder of a
border patrol agent, the kidnapping of Americans by drug traffickers, and the
arrests of three American citizens following the gun battles in Tamaulipas. 36
The Mexican government has adopted a clear policy to foment the rule of law
and security as integral and interdependent components of a safe and democratic
society. 37 It has made that policy one of the five basic themes of its National
Development Plan. 38 The challenge is to implement that policy in a way that
achieves the fruition of both components, both security and the rule of law.
"The Congressional Research Service notes that Latin America has among the
highest homicide rates in the world, and in recent years murder rates have been
increasing in several countries in Central America. ' '39 "Latin America's average
rate of 27.5 homicides per 100,000 people is three times the world average of 8.8
30 See, e.g., Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Request to Fund Security
Cooperation with Mexico and Central America, (Oct. 22, 2007), available at http://nicaragua.usembassy.
gov/october 22_2007.html.
31 Id.
32 See generally, Fact Sheet: The Merida Initiative: United States - Mexico - Central America Coop-
eration, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Oct. 22, 2007, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/
93800.htm; see also Armand Peschard-Sverdrup, CEO of the Peschard-Sverdrup and Associates, Speaker
at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research on Battling the Deadly Drug Cartels in
Mexico: A Shared Responsibility (Nov. 8, 2007), transcript available at http://www.aei.org/events/
filter.,eventID.1584/transcript.asp [hereinafter Peschard-Sverdrup].
33 Peschard-Sverdrup, supra note 32.
34 Jo Tuckerman, Drug Violence Raises Fears in Mexico, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 8, 2007.
35 James C. McKinley Jr., Mexico Hits Drug Gangs With Full Fury of War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22,
2008 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01 /22/world/americas/22mexico.html?_r= l &oref=slog
in.
36 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Congressman Tom Tancredo of Colorado, Tancredo Demands Par-
don of Border Agent amid New Killing (Jan. 22, 2008), available at http://tancredo.house.gov/PRArticle
.aspx?NewsID=1335.
37 El Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2007-2012, Mensaje del Presidente Felipe Calder6n Hinojosa
(2007), http://pnd.presidencia.gob.mx/.
38 Id.
39 Clare M. Ribando, Congressional Research Service, Report on Gangs in Central America, CRS
Report for Congress 2 (July 27, 2007), http://www.wola.org/media/crs%20gangsO7.pdf.
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homicides per 100,000 people."'40  "Based on the most recent Crime Trend
Surveys (CTS) data available from the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC), Guatemala and El Salvador are among the most violent coun-
tries in the world for which standardized data has been collected." '4 ' "Whereas
homicide rates in Colombia, historically the most violent country in Latin
America, have fallen in the past few years, homicides have increased dramati-
cally in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras."'42 "In 2005, the estimated mur-
der rate per 100,000 people was roughly fifty-six in El Salvador, forty-one in
Honduras, and thirty-eight in Guatemala.
43
What is in the M~rida Package?
The M6rida Initiative is an American foreign assistance package consisting of
training and equipment that has been proposed to the U.S. Congress. This pack-
age is the result of extensive negotiations with our Mexican and Central Ameri-
can counterparts. 44 Through the Merida Initiative, the United States seeks to
strengthen our partners' capacities in three broad areas: (1) Counter-Narcotics,
Counterterrorism, and Border Security; (2) Public Security and Law Enforce-
ment; and (3) Institution Building and Rule of Law. 45 In order to strengthen our
partners in these areas, four goals were set:
1) Break the power and impunity of criminal organizations;
2) Assist the Governments of Mexico and Central America in strengthen-
ing border, air, and maritime controls from the Southwest border of
the United States to Panama;
3) Improve the capacity of justice systems in the region to conduct inves-
tigations and prosecutions; implement the rule of law; protect human
rights; and sever the influence of incarcerated criminals with outside
criminal organizations; and
4) Curtail gang activity in Mexico and Central America and diminish the
demand for drugs in the region.46
Funding is currently split between a multi-year plan, potentially encompassing
two to three fiscal years.47 About a third of the money is in the President's
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Press Release, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), WOLA Sees Positive Points, Short-
comings in Bush Administration's Mexico and Central America Aid Package (Oct.22, 2007) available at
http://www.wola.org/index.php?option=com-content&task=viewp&id=587&Itemid=
8
.
45 Jacobson, supra note 23.
46 The Mirida Initiative: Assessing Plans to Step up our Security Cooperation with Mexico and
Central America: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 14 (2007) [hereinafter
Mirida Initiative Hearings] (testimony of David T. Johnson, Assistant Sec'y of State) available at http:II
foreignaffairs.house.gov/1 10/joh I 11407.pdf.
47 Colleen W. Cook, Rebecca G. Rush, & Clare Ribando Seelke, Congressional Research Service,
Merida Initiative: Background and Funding, CRS Report for Congress (Mar. 18, 2008), assets.opencrs.
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FY2008 supplemental request, currently pending in Congress, integrated with the
Iraq and Pakistan supplemental request. 48 The balance would come in the ordi-
nary fiscal year 2009 and 2010 budgets.49 All of the funding comes from the
foreign assistance budget - there is no military or domestic M6rida program
funding. While Mexico and the Central American governments are attacking
crime with their domestic budgets and funding, and the U.S. is doing the same
with its domestic law enforcement budget, M6rida represents only the foreign
assistance portion from the U.S. to Mexico and Central America. 50
The three year Mexican component of the M6rida Initiative, at the proposed
$1.4 billion level, is based on a proposal presented to the U.S. back in May of
2007. 5 1 On August 21, the heads of state of Canada, the U.S., and Mexico met in
Montebello, where President Bush noted:
The United States is committed to this joint strategy to deal with a joint
problem. I would not be committed to dealing with this if I wasn't con-
vinced that President Calder6n had the will and the desire to protect his
people from narco-traffickers. He has shown great leadership and great
strength of character, which gives me good confidence that the plan we'll
develop will be effective. 52
Following the Montebello Summit, the Mexican proposal was further refined
in September and validated in December through on-site inspections and consul-
tations between officials from both the U.S. and Mexico. All of the Central
American funding and sixty percent of the Mexican funding requested in the
FY2008 supplemental bill was allotted to aid civilian agencies in those coun-
tries. 53 Approximately forty percent of the funding would be used for military
purposes. 54 That percentage splits in FY2009 and FY2010, with monies shifting
to the civilian side.
com/rpts/RS22837_20080318.pdf; see also The Mexico/Central America Security Cooperation Package
On-The-Record Briefing via Conference Call, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Oct. 22, 2007, available at http://
www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/07/q4/93955.htm (Remarks of Thomas A. Shannon, Assistant Sec'y for
Western Hemisphere Affairs).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 The U.S. has been making gains in its domestic efforts to reduce the demand for drugs and attack
its own organized crime problem. See, for example, Testimony of John P. Waiters, Director of National
Drug Control Policy, Before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee
on Domestic Policy, Chairman Dennis Kucinich, I 10th Congress, March 12, 2008, available at http://
www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/NEWS/testimony08/031208/031208.pdf
51 The proposal followed from discussions in Washington, D.C. between U.S. and Mexican foreign
ministries in May 2007. See REPORT TO THE S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 10th Cong., THE
MERIDA INITIATIVE: "GuNs, DRUGS AND FRIENDS" 5 n.3 (Comm. Print 2007).
52 President's News Conference With Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada and President Felipe
de Jesus Calderon Hinojosa of Mexico in Montebello, Canada, 43 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc 1095 (Aug.
21, 2007).
53 Merida Initiative Hearings, supra note 46 at 10 (testimony of Thomas A. Shannon, Assistant
Sec'y for Western Hemisphere Affairs).
54 See also Round Table of Deputy Secretary with Journalists, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Oct. 30, 2007,
available at www.state.gov/s/d/2007/94671.htm (Remarks of Thomas A. Shannon, Assistant Sec'y for
Western Hemisphere Affairs).
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Why is there funding to help the Mexican military? Unfortunately, right now,
Mexican organized crime is very well-armed. 55 Only the military has the re-
sources to identify and ferret out criminal enterprises from where it has metasta-
sized. Furthermore, while President Calder6n readily admits he would prefer to
use civilian law enforcement and police, they are not simply ready or adequate.
56
The Mdrida funding proposal would allow time for the civilian police capacity to
upgrade, while still standing up to the immediate challenge. 57 This process is
time consuming since the Calder6n administration is inspecting and reviewing
the current federal police first in order to root out corruption. 58 Before we give
them more equipment and training, we want to ensure that we're not training the
wrong side.
If approved, the Mdrida Initiative will provide funding for:
" Non-intrusive inspection equipment, ion scanners, canine units for
Mexican customs, for the new federal police and for the military to
interdict trafficked drugs, arms, cash and persons;
59
" Technologies to improve and secure communication systems to sup-
port collecting information as well as ensuring that vital information is
accessible for criminal law enforcement;
* Technical advice and training to strengthen the institutions of justice
- vetting for the new police force, case management software to
track investigations through the system to trial, new offices of citizen
complaints and professional responsibility, and establishing witness
protection programs;
* Helicopters and surveillance aircraft to support interdiction activities
and rapid operational response of law enforcement agencies in
Mexico;
* Initial funding for security cooperation with Central America that re-
sponds directly to Central American leaders' concerns over gangs,
drugs, and arms articulated during July SICA meetings and the SICA
Security Strategy; and
55 Corchado, supra note 6.
56 Tuckerman, supra note 34 (noting that local law enforcement has been reduced in size to merely
"symbolic" and local and state police hold a reputation as corrupt and unprofessional).
57 While supporting the Merida Initiative generally, U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the ranking Re-
publican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, called on the plan to provide adequate assurances to
support and assist civilian police and prosecutors "because fighting illicit drugs is a traditional law en-
forcement mission, not a military one." House Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S. House of Representa-
tives, Statement by Rep. Ileana ros-Lehtinen, "Ros-Lehtinen Urges Congress to OK Supplemental Funds
for U.S. Mexico Initiative to Battle Drugs, Organized Crime," (Jan. 3, 2008).
58 Patrick Corcoran, Corruption Could Be Undoing of Mexico's Judicial Reforms, MEXIDATA.INFO,
Mar. 17, 2008, http://www.mexidata.info/idl754.html (discussing how the Mexicans are tackling corrup-
tion with this program).
59 See Marc Lacey, Mexico: U.S. Vows Tougher Controls on Guns, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 17, 2008, avail-
able at www.nytimes.com2008/01l/17/worldlamericas (discussing Attorney General Michael B.
Mukasey's plan to crackdown on the illegal flow of firearms from the U.S. to Mexico); see also Press
Release, U.S. Embassy in Mexico (highlighting Ambassador Antonio 0. Garza's comments: "Our Con-
tinued Efforts Will Deny Firearms to Criminal Organizations and Reduce Gun Violence), (Jan. 16, 2008).
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* Equipment and assets to support counterpart security agencies inspect-
ing and interdicting drugs, trafficked goods, people and other contra-
band as well as equipment, training and community action programs
in Central American countries to implement anti-gang measures and
expand the reach of these measures in the region.60
One concern about any program in rule of law is making sure we don't help
the criminals themselves. We have had extensive discussions on these issues
with human rights and transparency groups, including a session led directly by
Deputy Secretary John Negroponte in Mexico City in November 2007.61 If the
Mexican law enforcement entities are infiltrated with criminals and leaks, how
can we be sure we are not training the criminals? We have heard this not just
from American NGOs, but from the Mexican NGOs too, and we have listened.
First, to assure accountability and anticorruption, we are vetting the police
recruits with lie detector tests. We are also vetting the people doing the vetting.
Second, we are not proposing any cash transfers to Mexican ministries. 62 If the
program requires equipment to be purchased, the U.S. government will do that.
We are not writing any checks. Third, we are establishing information technol-
ogy systems so that investigative and law enforcement agencies can share data
and talk to each other. Amazingly, we did not do this in the past. Fourth, we will
secure communications. Previously the criminals could simply listen in on law
enforcement planning. That will now be stopped. Even better, we are working
toward inter-operability among Mexican and American agencies, should that be
necessary for successful missions. Fifth, human rights and anticorruption train-
ing will be integrated into the police academy curricula. Finally, the Calder6n
administration has accepted all recommendations from the Mexican Human
Rights Commission concerning military involvement with the police.
Mexico's Program to Address Organized Crime
Crime and violence diminish the security and well being of all who live in
Mexico. They undermine confidence in democratic government within the coun-
try and also tarnish Mexico's international image.
Widespread public concern about crime and violence can help to forge a na-
tional consensus in favor of a coherent response. Such a response could effec-
tively confront the immediate threat and also build the institutional base needed
to preserve security and protect the rights of all on a sustainable basis.
In Mexico, the public demand for security is coupled with a demand for the
fair and timely administration of justice.63 It should be possible to design a strat-
60 The Merida Initiative: Guns, Drugs and Friends Report Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 3-4 (Dec. 21, 2007).
61 See John Negroponte, Deputy U.S. Sec'y of State, Round Table of Deputy Secretary with Journal-
ists (Oct. 30, 2007), www.state.gov/s/d/2007/94671.htm.
62 Corchado & Connolly, supra note 29; The Merida Initiative: Guns, Drugs and Friends Report
Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 4 (Dec. 21, 2007).
63 See Sara Howard, Editorial, "Partnership Will Jeopardize Mexican rights," THE ITHACAN ONLINE,
Mar. 20, 2008, available at http://theithacan.org/an/publish/opinioncommentary/200803-Partnership-
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egy that combines elements of combating crime, safeguarding rights, and contrib-
uting to a culture of lawfulness.
Some countries have enhanced the capacities for repressive measures through
their police or other security forces. They have done so while deferring the re-
form of the justice system which is capable of holding all persons equally ac-
countable under the law, including the security forces themselves. In those cases,
strengthened security forces operating without strong guarantees of legal protec-
tion have often become obstacles to broad institutional change.
On the other hand, efforts to strengthen the institutional capacities of the jus-
tice system that have not addressed immediate and powerful threats from crimi-
nal elements will inevitably fail. Effects that ignore the pervasive criminal
element will likely fail because the public is unable to see direct and long-term
benefits from the reforms while crime continues unabated.
Mexico does not need to choose between the priorities of security and justice.
The issues of both components of the rule of law have been studied exhaustively.
The government has developed sound policies for addressing these inseparable
issues, as reflected in the National Development Plan. It has the capacity to im-
plement those strategies. What is needed is to build a critical mass of support -
in federal and state governments, the judiciary, the Congress, and civil society -
that will sustain the legal, institutional and enforcement reforms that are all nec-
essary to achieve the desired results.
President Calder6n's administration is committed to implementing justice re-
form as part of his program to restore public security. All three branches of the
Mexican government are working to transform the criminal justice system from a
written inquisitorial to an oral, adversarial system. 64
With help from a coalition of civil society organizations, ProDerecho, sup-
ported by USAID, 6 5 the national Mexican Congress passed the required constitu-
tional amendments by the end of 2007 to change the legislative framework, and
in March 2008, passed a new federal Criminal Procedure Code. 66 Ten Mexican
states are even further along, having already begun the reform process, with Chi-
huahua and Oaxaca at the most advanced stage - that of actually conducting
oral trials on a pilot basis, again with help from the USAID-assisted ProDerecho
coalition. 67
will-jeopardizeMexicanRights (discussing the unease about investing in the security sector while
human rights remain vulnerable).
64 Arturo Alvarado, Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson Int'l Ctr. for Scholars: Reforming the Admin-
istration of Justice in Mexico (Feb. 25, 2008), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?
topic-id=5949&fuseaction=topics.event summary&event id=372275.
65 John Moody, Reforming Justice: USAID Assists Mexican Judicial Reform Campaign, ENTREPRE-
NEUR, May 2005, available at http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/132870635.html.
66 Olga R. Rodriguez, Mexico Senate Approves Judicial Reform, ABC NEWS, Mar. 7, 2008, available
at http://abcnews.go.com/InternationallwireStory?id=4405673.
67 See generally Steven E. Hendrix, Innovation in Criminal Procedure in Latin America: Guate-
mala's Conversion to the Adversarial System, 5 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM 365 (1998) (discussing how the
USAID helped Guatemala with similar reforms a decade earlier).
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Mexico and the U.S. have agreed that they must fight international organized
crime together as full partners. 68 What role does justice reform play in this fight
against international crime? How can the U.S. Government support this reform
process?
International experience has demonstrated that public security is best achieved
when tougher law enforcement is combined with a justice system that can more
quickly and broadly prosecute and punish criminals. As law enforcement in-
creases the arrests of criminal suspects, the justice system must cope with in-
creased case loads to avoid the appearance of criminal impunity or other failures
in judicial procedures.
In Mexico's first week of experience in implementing oral trials in the State of
Chihuahua, seventy percent of forty-eight reviewed cases were resolved through
one of the seven case resolution alternatives permitted by the reformed criminal
codes of procedure. 69 Previously these same cases would have taken anywhere
from a couple of months to a few years to resolve. This expedited case process-
ing permitted the Public Ministry to re-direct its resources to prosecuting more
serious crimes. Mexico's success mirrors other Latin American experiences.
Colombia reduced time-to-trial by ninety percent, with seventy percent of cases
being plea-bargained and adjudicated within weeks rather than the customary
wait of several years under the old system. Bolivia reduced trial times signifi-
cantly and cut average case costs from $2400 to $600.70
Justice Reform - Mexico's Own Investment
President Calder6n enjoys a high public approval of his fight to restore public
security.71 Public understanding and support is essential as the Government en-
acts and implements judicial reforms that might include alternative dispute reso-
lution, new types of courts, and new alternatives for case disposition and
sentencing.
President Calder6n has demonstrated his commitment to fight organized crime
by using police and military resources to frontally attack criminals. 72 His top
68 Sean McCormack, Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks at the U.S. Department of State's
Daily Press Briefing (Jan. 16, 2008) available at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/2008/jan/99389.htm.
69 See U.S. Embassy in Mexico: Oral Trials in Chihuahua Advance, USAID Weekly Report, July 26,
2006, http://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/fera/research/targeted/intemationaUJuly-2026.pdf; see also Sean Matt-
son, Chihuahua pioneers judicial reform, EXPRESS NEWS, Mar. 8, 2008, available at http://www.mysan
antonio.com/news/metro/stoies/MYSA030908.22A.judicialreform.36ff27 I.html.
70 Criminal Justice & Legal Reform, USAID Report on Latin America and the Caribbean, Mar. 31,
2005, http://www.usaid.gov locations/latin-america-caribbean/democracy/rule/dg-rule4.html; see also
Steven E. Hendrix, New Approaches to Addressing Corruption in the Context of U.S. Foreign Assistance
with Examples from Latin America and the Caribbean, 12 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM.1 (2005), and Steven
E. Hendrix, Current Legal Trends in the Americas: USAID Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law in
Latin America and the Caribbean, 9 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 277 (2003).
71 "Politics and Government," Frontera Norte-Sur (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.nmsu.edu/
-frontera/poli.html.
72 Ray Walser & James M. Roberts, WebMemo, The U.S. and Mexico: Taking the "Merida Initia-
tive" Against Narco-Terror, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Nov. 16, 2007, http://www.heritage.org/
Research/Crime/wm 1705.cfm.
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priority is restoring security and fighting crime, as evidenced in his speeches,
most notably his state of union address. While the U.S. has proposed $1.4 billion
for Mexico over three fiscal years, subject to U.S. Congressional approval, Presi-
dent Calder6n is seeking seven billion dollars from his legislature, again over
three years, to address the security sector at the federal level. In FY2007, Mex-
ico set aside three billion dollars for the program to address counter-narcotics and
organized crime. 73
The partnership is already producing tangible, measurable results, with unfor-
tunately, at times, very real sacrifices. This past year, there were a record sev-
enty-three extraditions from Mexico to the United States.74 Twenty three and a
half tons of cocaine were seized in one case alone in Manzanillo, Mexico. 75
But before things get better, the Mrrida Initiative is likely to change the cur-
rent strategy of organized crime of avoiding confrontation, to one of trying to
corrupt government, and where that does not work, to armed confrontation. We
are already at that stage in Nuevo Laredo, Tijuana, Sinaloa, Michoacin, Guer-
rero, Baja California, and Tamaulipas, where the Mexican military is engaged in
non-conventional operations to re-take territory. In the process, in 2007, over
250 Mexican security officials died in the line of duty trying to stop organized
crime, with over 2600 Mexicans dying as a result of organized crime, a murder
rate over twice that of 2005.76
The Mexican government has not relieved any pressure on the criminal organi-
zations, with the arrest of Alfredo Beltran, a major figure in the Sinaloa Cartel,
multiple arrests in Mexico City of associates of the Gulf Cartel, and purges of
state police in six different border towns. The Mexican authorities also moved
quickly to track and arrest the individuals responsible for the death of a U.S.
border patrol agent within days of the crime.
In May of 2007, Jose Nemecio Lugo Felix, the Director de Trafico y Trata
with CENAPI (Mexico's intelligence agency) was gunned down in Mexico City
while he was on his way to work.77 He is the highest ranking official within the
Mexican federal prosecutors' office (PGR) to be killed.78
During one week in September of 2007, five officials were killed. Omar Ra-
mirez Aguilar, the Director of an anti-organized crime unit from CENAPI was
killed as he left work in Polanco, which is considered the safest neighborhood in
73 Thomas A. Shannon, Assistant Sec'y for Western Hemisphere Affairs in U.S. Department of State,
Remarks at "On-the-Record: On the Mexico/Central America Security Cooperation Package," (Oct. 23,
2007) 5; see also The Merida Initiative: Guns, Drugs and Friends Report Before the S. Comm. on For-
eign Relations (Dec. 21, 2007).
74 Traci Carl, US Embassy: Mexico Seeks Missing Marine, WTOP NEWS, Jan. 29, 2008 http://www.
wtopnews.com/?nid=105&sid=1331200.
75 Roberta Jacobson, Deputy Assistant Sec'y of State for North American Affaire, Remarks at Enter-
prise Institute for Pub. Policy Research (Nov. 8, 2007).
76 Manuel Roig-Franzia, Drug Trade Tyranny on the Border, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2008, at A01,
available at http://www.star-telegram.com/279/story/546133.html.
77 Alejandro Gutierrez, Ejecutan a Funcionario de Combate a la Delincuencia de la PGR, PROCESO,
May 14, 2007, http://www.proceso.com.mx/noticia.html?sec=0&nta=50629.
78 Id.
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Mexico City. 79 Jamie Flores Escamilla, the Director of Security for the State of
San Luis Potosi was stopped by armed men who pulled his wife and two year old
son from the car, then shot him over fifty times. 80 Two Mexican security agents
who had been fighting narcos in Nueva Leon were also killed. In the State of
Guerrero, a municipal policeman was beheaded. An anonymous caller told the
police that the head was found wrapped in a newspaper near the police station.8
In February 2008, the Chihuahua Deputy Commander for Investigations was as-
sassinated right in front of the prosecution offices, he was the victim of a profes-
sional hit.82 As if this was not enough, on May 8, 2008, Edgar Milln G6mez,
the acting chief of Mexico's federal police, was assassinated.83 These are grue-
some examples of the sacrifices Mexican officials are making to fight organized
crime, just a few of the 2000 stories being told each year now of Mexican
sacrifice.
Mariclaire Acosta with the Organization of American States, formerly a gov-
ernment minister in the Fox administration (October 23, 2007 at the Inter-Ameri-
can Dialogue), noted Mexico has become one of the most dangerous countries on
earth to be a journalist.84 At ninety-two percent, high impunity rates for journal-
ist crimes remain a problem. The majority of deaths relate to coverage of the
drug trade, but there has also been an upsurge in political violence, and journal-
ists portray government vulnerabilities. 85 For example, journalists report on top-
ics such as corruption; linkages between law enforcement and drug traffickers;
and political conflicts, such as the one in Oaxaca where a U.S. journalist was
killed. 86 Reporters without Borders, an organization dedicated to defending and
ensuring the safety of journalists, states that Mexico had the worst record in the
Americas in 2006 and was second only to Iraq for the number of journalists
killed. 87
Mexico is committed to removing the cancer of organized crime and corrup-
tion. Their law enforcement officers are pledging their lives for this fight. The
79 Karen P. Tandy, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Agency, address at the IACP Second General
Assembly, (Oct. 16, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/speeches/sI01607.html).
80 Cop, Neighbor Gunned Down in Northwest Mexico, NOTIEMAIL NEWS, Sept. 23, 2007, http://
news.notiemail.com/noticia.asp?nt= 11458810&cty=200.
81 Mexican Drug Gang Attacks Government Intelligence Network, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 17,
2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2O07/09/18/america/LA-GEN-Mexico-Drugs.
php?WT.mcid=rssap-news.
82 Edgar Prado, Ejecutan a Comandante de la Policia Ministerial Afuera de la Subprocuraduria
Zona Centro, ENTRE LINEAS, Feb. 26, 2008.
83 James C. McKinley, Gunmen Kill Chief of Mexico's Police, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2008, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/09/world/americas/09mexico.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss.
84 Mariclaire Acosta, Director of the Organization of American States (OAS) Universal Civil Identity
Program and former Deputy Sec'y for Hum. Rights and Democracy at Mexico's Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Remarks at the Inter-American Dialogue: Violence, Democracy and Press Freedom in Mexico
and Colombia, (Oct. 23, 2007).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Mexico - Annual Report 2007, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, http://www.rsf.org/country-47.
php3?id-mot=248&Valider=OK, (last visited April 4, 2008).
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Mexican government is committing its own resources. 88 They ask for our help
and collaboration, as neighbors, in this struggle which will benefit us both.
Institutional Cooperation - Working Together for the Same Goals
The greatest benefit we have seen in other cooperative programs is that Mexi-
can and U.S. professionals learn how to work together to solve common
problems. As professionals share their experiences with one another, a trusting
relationship quickly evolves into greater cooperation on current cases. For exam-
ple, with USAID help, as the forensic experts from New Mexico worked with
Chihuahua's new forensic laboratory officials, they saw that evidence collected
on one side of the border could solve cases on the other side. 89 Again with
USAID help, the Association of U.S. States' Attorney Generals have already
begun discussions with their Mexican counterparts on how they can more ac-
tively work together on criminal and commercial cases. Through a USAID edu-
cation program, law schools on both sides of the border have requested support in
curriculum development and for expanded opportunities for students and profes-
sionals from both countries to study on the other side of the border.90 U.S. funds
can support these types of nontraditional bilateral partnerships.
The criminals have well developed networks and organizations that work
seamlessly across the border. Both of our law enforcement and judicial systems
need the same smooth working relationships to arrest, prosecute and punish these
well organized criminals. Both countries will benefit by encouraging a high de-
gree of professional bilateral cooperation as we invest in our joint capacity to
stop these international criminals on both sides of our shared border. With
roughly ninety-three percent of all crime in Mexico being done at the state rather
than the federal level, improved coordination within Mexico between states and
the federal government, and similar upgrades on our own side, are critical to the
success of the package. 9' USAID has engaged the Association of U.S. State
Attorneys General to coordinate closely with their Mexican federal and state
counterparts to improve and integrate efforts.
Central America
It would be unjust of us to consider the organized crime phenomena solely as a
border problem between the U.S. and Mexico. Anyone who lives in either Ti-
juana or San Diego can tell you that the border is already fully bi-national.
88 Colleen W. Cook, Rebecca G. Rush, & Clare Ribando Seelke, Congressional Research Service
Report, Merida Initiative: Background and Funding at 2 (Mar. 18, 2008).
89 Press Release, Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team (Feb. 23, 2006), available at http://
eaaf.typepad.com/pressrelease2.23.06.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Embassy in Mexico: Ambassador Garza
Announces $5 Million For Justice In Chihuahua (Feb. 3, 2005), available at http://www.usembassy-
mexico.gov/eng/releases/ep05O2O3reforma.html.
90 Steven E. Hendrix, Restructuring Legal Education in Guatemala: A Modelfor Law School Reform
in Latin America? 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 597 (2004), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/jle/ (dis-
cussing how USAID addressed legal education reform in Guatemala).
91 Leo Zuckerman, Remarks at Grupo Imagen, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 30, 2007).
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Moreover, cartels are very resourceful and do not stop at borders, whether that is
Mexico's northern border with the U.S., or its southern one with Guatemala and
Belize. We would be ignoring fundamental realities of our domestic crime and
narcotics problem if we believed that we could solve this problem through help-
ing only Mexico.92 For example, three Maryland MS-13 members where con-
victed in April 2007 on racketeering charges and with direct linkages to gang
"hits" in El Salvador.93 A more systemic approach, reaching all the way down to
Colombia, is required. That means including Central America in the equation. 94
The Secretariat for Central American Integration - SICA as it is known by its
acronym in Spanish - has articulated a strategy for addressing organized
crime.95 And as in Mexico, the SICA Plan offers the U.S. a unique opportunity
for collaboration in the struggle against corruption. 96  While the package obvi-
ously contains equipment and aircraft among other law enforcement tools, I
would like to highlight how the Mdrida Initiative also strikes a balance in Central
America with four important so-called "soft side" components.
The first component addresses court management. Here the Initiative will ex-
pand the Guatemala Clerk of Court pilot experience 97 and adapt it, as appropri-
ate, across Guatemala to other courts, such as civil or commercial courts that may
hear complex fraud cases, and to expand it to El Salvador, Honduras, and
Nicaragua.
Second, the U.S. government plans to improve prosecutor capacity. Here we
intend to work with the Public Ministries in the region to address high profile,
high impact crime with complex litigation strategies. This will be done by taking
advantage of the new tools in the package to streamline criminal prosecution and
get the cases into the system. 98
92 See Steven E. Hendrix, Lessons from Guatemala: US Foreign Policy and the Rule of Law, 23:4
HARV. INT'L REV. 14 (2002) (discussing the Guatemalan situation).
93 Ruben Castaneda, 3 MS-13 Leaders Convicted In Killings, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2007, at B02,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.conmwp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/27/AR2007042702108.
html?nav=emailpagel.
94 See Steven E. Hendrix, Importancia de la Reforma del Sistema Penal Nicaragaense, EL NUEVO
DIARIO (Managua, Nov. 17, 2006) available at http://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/2006/1l/17/opinion/
34103 (discussing the needs of justice sector reform for Nicaragua); see also Steven E. Hendrix, Eliminar
la Podredumbre de la Corrupci6n, EL NUEVO DIARIO (Managua, Dec. 9, 2006), available at http://www.
elnuevodiario.com.ni/2006/12/09/opinion/35949.
95 Secretariat for Central American Integration - SICA, "Estrategia de Seguridad de Centroamrica y
Mdxico" (Aug. 14, 2007).
96 See More Aid Sought in C. America to Head off Drug Fueled Crime, ARiz. DAILY STAR, Jan. 12,
2008, available at www.azstar.com.sn.printDS-220235; see also Thomas A. Shannon, Assistant Sec'y of
State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs for U.S. Department of State, Testimony before the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives (Nov. 14, 2007).
97 Steven E. Hendrix, Helping Guatemalans Get Their Day in Court, 40:6 FRONT LINES 14 (2000)
(discussing the Guatemalan Clerk of Court model, as assisted by USAID).
98 Steven E. Hendrix, Guatemalan "Justice Centers": The Centerpiece for Advancing Transparency,
Efficiency, Due Process and Justice Access, 15:4 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 101 (2000) (discussing how
USAID and other U.S. government agencies help with institutionalization of the rule of law and improv-
ing criminal prosecution), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/joumal/ilr/15/hendrix.pdfrd=l).
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The third component deals with gang prevention. 99 About fifty block grants
will go to at-risk communities for integrated programs to address gangs and pre-
vent violence. Grants are anticipated for Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador
- the places identified as most urgent under the inter-agency anti-gang strategy.
Finally, the Initiative envisions support for Community Policing. l°° This
funding will allow the USG to continue support for the Villa Nueva community
policing program in Guatemala, and expand that program to new communities in
that country.
What About the Economy
Economic growth is essential for Mexico. The reason we have so much illegal
immigration to the U.S. has to do with the lack of economic opportunity in Mex-
ico. There are more than forty million people in poverty in Mexico, more than
all of Central America combined.' 0 ' Mexico ranks Seventy-Third in the world in
terms of Gross National Income per Capita at $7870 per capita, compared to the
US at $44,970, per capita. 10 2 You might ask why we are not proposing to do
more on the economy instead of the security sector. 103
There are two basic reasons for this. First, President Calder6n already has a
national development strategy to reduce poverty. 1°4 Those efforts are underway.
Topics like alternative development that you find in Plan Colombia, for example,
are not being requested by the Mexican government. Mexico does all of its own
illicit crop eradication, and has on-going programs with schools to educate chil-
dren about the dangers of drugs. 10 5 Second, the Mexicans have just enacted com-
prehensive fiscal reform to increase tax revenue to support their own
modernization efforts. 10 6 If successful, this should provide Mexican resources to
address their own problems on a more sustainable basis.
99 See U.S. Agency for International Development, Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment
(Apr. 2006) (discussing how USAID is addressing gang issues), available at http://www.usaid.gov/
locations/latinamerica caribbean/democracy/gangs-assessment.pdf.
100 See USAID's Franco Advocates Community Policing As a Growing Component of Development,
available at http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin-americacaribbean/franco-csis.html.
101 See The World Bank, Mexico Country Brief, 2007, available at http://web.worldbank.org/WB-
SITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/MEXICOEXTN/O,,contentMDK:20185184-pagePK: 14113
7-piPK:141127-theSitePK:338397,00.html (showing a full range of economic statistics on Mexico).
102 Id.
103 See Steven E. Hendrix, Implementation of the Santiago Summit Plan of Action in the field: A Look
at USAID's Programs in Education, Democracy, Trade Integration, Economic Growth and Poverty Re-
duction in Guatemala, 7 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 44 (1998) (discussing the USAID's robust pro-
grams for social sector development in the hemisphere); Steven E. Hendrix, Advancing Toward
Privatization, Education Reform, Popular Participation and Decentralization: Bolivia's Innovation in
Legal and Economic Reform, 1993-1997, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 679 (1997).
104 Government of Mexico, El Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2007-2012, 2007, http://pnd.presi
dencia.gob.mx/.
105 See Politics and Government, FRONTERA NORTE-SUR, Mar. 2008, http://www.nmsu.edu/-frontera/
poli.html.
106 Standard & Poor's Upgrades Mexico after Passage of Fiscal Reform, INT'L HERALD TRm., Oct. 8,
2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/ 2 0 0 7 /10/08/america/LA-FIN-Mexico-Upgrade.php.
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By way of background, as a member of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), Mexico is the world's fourteenth largest economy and the
U.S.'s third largest trading partner.'0 7 The U.S. traded over one billion dollars
per day of trade in goods and services with Mexico in 2007.10 8 Remittances are
also critical. They totaled twenty-four billion dollars in 2007, which is much less
than the value of trade between the two countries. 0 9 In contrast, USAID budget
request for Mexico is $16.5 million for FY2009, reduced from $37.5 million in
FY2005. Markets work best to promote economic growth and jobs. But they
need a firm basis in an environment that provides security. We hope that the
Mexican government will be able to provide that environment with the increased
help from the M6rida Initiative.
Mexico and Central America: Integrating Justice Reform with Public
Security
It is clear that public security and an effective justice system are inseparable
aspects of a single concept. History has demonstrated that efforts to increase
security are made sustainable by the rule of law, and that the rule of law flour-
ishes in a climate of security. It is equally clear that Mexico's policy recognizes
the intimate linkage between security and justice. Implementing that policy will
require careful choices about priorities and sequencing of strategies and actions.
The experience of other reforming countries suggests that the risk of proceed-
ing in a linear fashion with too narrow an agenda may be greater than a broad
approach that confronts related issues simultaneously. The challenge is to take
that experience into account in designing a reform program that will meet the
region's needs for security within the rule of law. The M6rida Initiative proposes
just such a balance for both Mexico and Central America.
No one is under any illusion that a $1.4 billion program for Mexico or a
$150,000 program with Central America 10 - split over three fiscal years and
seven countries - will solve the problem. It is not a silver bullet."'I But it will
certainly increase our chances so that twenty years from now we are not still
facing this scourge. Democracy and the rule of law in the region mean we must
stand with our neighbors and link our interests and our strengths to begin to
tackle issues that affect us all. We see in the M6rida Initiative a new paradigm
for collaboration and cooperation, and a new spirit to begin to address what are
107 Id.
108 U.S. Department of Commerce, Mexico's Country Commercial Guide (Mar. 3, 2008), http://www.
buyusa.gov/mexico/en/mexico-commercial-guide.html.
109 Krissah Williams, Immigrants Sending $45 Billion Home, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2007, at A09,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/18/AR2006101801756.
html.
110 See Thomas A. Shannon, Assistant Sec'y for Western Hemisphere Affairs in U.S. Department of
State, Remarks at "On-the-Record: On the Mexico/Central America security Cooperation Package," 5
(Oct. 23, 2007) (noting that "We are still in the midst of talking with the Centrals about the parameters of
that larger package so we can't give you a larger number, but it's our hope that that also would be a
multiyear program").
I"l Peschard-Sverdrup, supra note 32.
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real life and death issues, whether in an American school or on the streets of
Ciudad Juarez or Tegucigalpa.
What Is USAID's Portion of the Merida Initiative
One of the recurring questions in our discussions on the Mrrida Initiative is
how much is each agency going to receive? How much will go to the Depart-
ment of Defense? How much for the Justice Department? Homeland Security?
Those are important questions, especially for oversight committees in Congress.
In the past, the answer was much easier since the programs were designed in
stovepipes along institutional lines.
The design of the Mrrida Initiative, however, is very different. We began with
a needs assessment and request produced by Mexico and SICA. We then vali-
dated those through site visits, consultations, and negotiations. We then pro-
posed integrated packages that would achieve the objectives. There was certainly
more work to be done than any single U.S. government department or agency
could handle, and no single department or agency had the competency or capac-
ity to do it all. In other words, there was room enough for everyone.
In participating on the design, we were guided not by what was best for this
agency or that, but rather what would be the best integrated program to respond
to the challenge. The budget and program were submitted that way to Congress.
Since then, we have been asked by Congress to itemize what each U.S. govern-
ment department or agency would receive under Mrrida, and we have provided
our best estimates. However, much depends on what Congress' recommenda-
tions to the administration. In appropriating the funds, Congress has its chance to
contribute to the discussion. There is still no final word on funding allocations
among U.S. government entities.
In Central America, we are asked how much a particular country will get
under Mrrida. Again, we have provided itemized lists to Congress for its consid-
eration, but the final figures will depend on what Congress instructs. So that too
remains a bit fluid for the moment.
Conclusion
In the short run, the Mrrida Initiative may actually increase levels of violence
in Mexico as organized crime fights back. 1 2 The performance measurement
tools and indicators are currently being negotiated with the Mexican govern-
ment,1 13 and then will be vetted via an inter-agency process within the U.S. gov-
ernment, and then shared with Congress before they are set in stone. That
process is still underway, and we have not yet released that to the public since it
is still in draft.
112 See Alfred Corchado, Drug Czar Says U.S. Use Fueling Mexico Violence, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Feb. 22, 2008, (explaining that John P. Walters from the Office of National Drug Control Policy
belief in the possibility of increased levels of violence in the months ahead), available at http://www.
dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/world/mexic/stries/02228dnintdrugs. 3 a9 8 bbO.html.
113 Alfredo Corchado & Tim Connolly, Q&A: Merida Initiative, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 16,
2008, available at www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/world/mexico/stories.
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So what will be the benefits of M6rida? We have to look longer-term, beyond
a one year supplemental budget or even a three year effort. But I think it is
realistic to expect, first and foremost, improved stabilization of our borders in the
region, including our own, as countries improve their rule of law and decrease
the dangers from narcotics. If we fail to act, we are more likely to see narco-
states in the region, kleptocratic regimes interested in lining their own pockets
while turning a blind eye to drugs flowing northward toward American schools.
Second, with the Mdrida Initiative, we have an opportunity to engage improved
political will, both in our own country as well as in Mexico, Central America and
Colombia. We need to nurture this and reward it. And the M6rida Initiative
represents positive regional, collaborative leadership on this issue to do just that.
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